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environmental constraints. This study discusses market operation in quality-constrained sectors, like gasoline
and additives; processors expand output until marginal processing cost equals the processing margin between
product revenues and raw material costs; retailers who buy gasoline and additives from processors and sell
blended retail gasoline price sales at a marginal cost that includes the blended input value plus adjustments for
values of constrained attributes; and market supplies and demands of measurable attributes like octane are
balanced. This method can enhance predictions about the effects of new policies that regulate product quality.
Analysis can now include price and output adjustment in factor and product markets, and the competitiveness
of new processes and products.
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1Welfare Maximization, Product Pricing, and Market 
Allocation in the Gasoline and Additives Market
Some energy Policy analyses  focus on the effects of large price changes in international
markets.  Multi-sector econometric models (Broadman and Hogan) or Computable General
Equilibrium models ( Uri;  Kemfert and Welsch; Breuss and Steininger ) help to evaluate the
overall consequences for a country’s energy sector and macro economy.  Mathematical
programming models also remain useful, especially when environmental or performance
constraints limit production choices in the energy sector.  But sector models are typically
extensions of firm problems, in that the objective function concerns processor profits or costs,
input prices are given, and product demands are taken as inelastic ( Vlachou, Basso, and
Andrikopoulos; Manne).   Under these assumptions, consumer price adjustments are synomous
with firm cost adjustments.  For better understanding of markets and price relationships in the
presence of environmental regulation, inelastic facor supplies and price responsive demands
should be taken into account.
Mathematical programming models of markets have also been a mainstay in applied
economic research.  These models exploit the fact that the equilibrium of a perfectly competitive
market or sector is implied by maximum welfare allocations (Samuelson). One advantage of
spatial equilibrium models is estimation of market entry and exit prices (Takayama and Judge). 
Similarly, sector models evaluate the competitiveness of value-added enterprises such as
processing sectors in a market setting (McCarl and Spreen, Takayama and Judge (1964)). 
In some cases where constraints are imposed by a government policy,  programming
models suggest that markets maximize the welfare that can be obtained with the policy in place. 
2For instance, Bawden and Takayama/Judge  have shown that welfare maximization, constrained
by trade policy, is consistent with market equilibrium; many of the situations encountered in
international trade have been considered, including the fixed import duty, the variable levy, the
fixed export subsidy, and the fixed import quota.  Cox and Chavez show the equivalence of
welfare maximization and market outcomes, when welfare is constrained by a government
sanctioned system of price wedges and the net extractions of taxes (contributions of subsidies)
are subtracted from (added to) sector welfare.  Research on the relevance of programming models
for situations where the market must perform in harmony with a government policy, however, is
limited.
This paper demonstrates the usefulness of programming models for markets where
quality and environmental restrictions impinge on market outcomes.  Quality standards are an
increasingly common form of market intervention, as a means of ensuring product performance,
food safety, and environmental compatibility.  The case of fuels and additive markets, where
agricultural products are becoming important, is emphasized in this paper.  First, a model of  the
consumer demand for gasoline, the production and blending of the intermediate products
(additives and refinery gasoline), and the demand/supply for inputs to gasoline production
(petroleum, natural gas and byproducts, and biomass) is discussed.  Second, a welfare function
and a quality restriction on the octane of gasoline is specified for the fuel sector.  The first order
conditions for this problem are shown consistent with a competitive market and the effects of the
quality constraint on market pricing of gasoline is discussed.  Third, a three good numerical
example is presented to illustrate the tractability of the programming problem, and to indicate the
effects of quality restriction on market pricing. 
3Factor-Product Relationships in the Fuel and Additives Market
The main material and product flows in the gasoline complex are shown in chart 1.
Starting with the factor inputs on the LHS, crude petroleum (Qo) is the main input into the
refinery.  Several types of refinery gasoline (Qr) are produced and then blended into automobile
fuel (Qs).  Each type of refinery gasoline has unique qualities; some perform well (e.g., have high
octane) in a gasoline engine but burn dirty from an environmental viewpoint; some have
moderate performance characteristics and burn clean; some have marginal performance
characteristics and still burn dirty.  Gasoline additives (Qp) are produced because they have more
desirable performance and/or environmental properties.  The additives are blended into motor
gasoline, sometimes at slightly higher cost than other gasoline components, to improve the
characteristics of refinery gasoline.  Several input chemicals (Ql) are used in the production of
additives.  Many of the input chemicals are byproducts of natural gas production.  Others can be
produced directly from natural gas.  The supply of some input chemicals is also supplemented by
the byproducts of petroleum refining. Biomass (including corn) is also an input for one gasoline
additive.  In chart 1, the natural gas and biomass blocks are shown by dotted lines because these
factors are not explicitly included in the model.
Supply and Demand
Three sets of supply and Demand functions are needed to specify a maximization
problem and market model:  consumer demand, processing supply (marginal cost), and factor
supply.
Consumers require different gasoline grades according to the performance characteristics
4of their automobile.  The price-dependent demand function for grade i is
Psi = "si - $si Qsi .
No substitution between grades is assumed because technology defines an appropriate quality.
Fixed proportions production processes are adequate for this problem. Most additive
processes combine two or more chemicals to make a third chemical, so they might be referred to
as ‘constructive’ processes.  Hence the supply (marginal cost) function for additives processing is
stated in terms of the production of the additive output. The processing supply curve for additive
i is 
The marginal cost function includes wages and utilities but does not include the cost of material
inputs.  The cost of the input chemicals, expressed on a per unit output basis, must be added to
the processing to obtain the marginal cost of additive production. In the case of constant marginal
cost, the slope of the above supply function is zero ($pi = 0).
A refinery breaks a petroleum molecule into many smaller molecules, making several
types of refinery gasoline.  So the refinery might be referred to as a destructive process.  Here, the
supply (marginal cost) for petroleum processing is stated in terms of the crude petroleum input as
follows
Again, this marginal cost function does includes wages and utilities but excludes costs for
material inputs. The refinery is actually a collection of fixed proportion production process (Gary
and Handwerk).  Most of the choices concerning the product mix coming from a barrel of oil are
5set in the long-run period when the configuration of fixed proportion production processes is
chosen. The remaining choices in short-run allocation decisions, the allocation of intermediate
gas-oils for gasoline or diesel production, the sale or internal use of residual fuel oil, and the
proportion of kerosine in the gasoline mix do not vary widely from year to year.  Hence, the fixed
proportions assumption is a good first approximation.
Most of the factor supply curves for additive inputs are likely upward sloping because
they are the byproducts of natural gas production.  Further, domestic production is supplemented
by imports.  The price-dependent supply for additive input i is 
PRi = "Ri + $Ri QRi
For the moment, assume that the factor supply curves include one biomass based input for the
production of one additive.  A processing complex for ethanol and a supply curve for crude
petroleum will be important for large simulation models of this sector.  For now, they just add
complexity without changing the basic relationships developed here.  Also, the price of crude
petroleum (Po) is taken as exogenous.     
Maximizing Welfare
Sector welfare is consumer surplus less the operating and material costs associated with
processing.  The objective function states consumer welfare as the area under the product
demand curves.  Processing costs are given by the area under the appropriate processing supply
function–processing costs for several additives processes and the refinery sector are given below. 
 Factor costs for additive inputs are also given by the area under the appropriate supply function. 
Finally, expenditures defined by price times quantity are used for crude petroleum, since the
petroleum price is exogenous to the refinery sector.
6The lagrangian for the maximization problem also includes several constraints on sector
welfare.  Most of these constraints are (judicially stated) supply-utilization identities for the
markets in the gasoline and additives sector. To illustrate performance and environmental
constraints on the market, an octane constraint on gasoline grades is also included.  The
lagrangian for a three-dimensional example is given in equation (1):  there are three gasoline
products (regular, midgrade, premium), three additive inputs (isobutane, propylene, and corn),
three additive processes (MTBE, alkylates and ethanol), and three types of refinery gasoline
(catalytic cracker, reformer and coker). Further generalization is possible, but is more difficult to
see the development of properties for this maximization problem.
The groups of supply-utilization identities are identified by the greek letter for the
corresponding lagrange multiplier.  All of these constraints follow the inequality convention of
programming models of markets, that supply equals or exceeds demand. The constraints with
8 state that the supply of a factor for additive production plus the factor supply derived as a
byproduct of petroleum production equals or exceeds the demand for the factor.  Further, the
production of additive (Qpi) i times the input requirement of factor j in the production of additive
i (rij) defines the demand for a particular factor arising from a given additive.  
The other supply constraints concern blending.  The variable Zij indicates the amount of
gasoline component i used in product j.  There are six gasoline components in the example.
Components 1, 2, and 3 are gasoline additives.  Components 4, 5, and 6 are types of refinery
gasoline.  The equations with Ni state that the supply of gasoline components in a particular grade
of fuel equals or exceeds the demand for that grade of fuel.  The equations with :i state that the
supply of additive i equals or exceeds the demand for that additive in all grades of fuel.  The
equations with 2i state that the supply of each type of refinery gasoline equals or exceeds the
demand for that type of refinery gasoline across all fuel grades.  Notice that the subscript for 2
corresponds to the origin (first) index for the variable -.  Blending is specified as a costless
7activity here but, as the reader can verify, the main results are unchanged if a constant blending
cost term for is added for each Zij.  
Octane equations are included to illustrate the effects of performance or environmental
constraints.  These equations, indicated by the lagrange multiplier Ri, are also a supply-demand
identity.  They state that the supply of octane equals or exceeds the demand for octane.  Oi   
indicates the octane content of a particular gasoline component and Kj indicates the octane
performance standard.  An conventional form for this quality constraint in firm lp models, which
states that recipe shares of gasoline components equals or exceeds the quality standard, can be
obtained by dividing both sides of the equation by Qsj. 
  =
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
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First Order Conditions 
The first order conditions are derivatives with respect to quantity variables and lagrange
multipliers that are determined in the market and processing system.  The first order conditions
for the three dimensional example are given below. Equations (a) through (e) are obtained by
differentiating quantity variables.    Equations (f) through (j) are supply-demand identities
obtained by differentiating with respect to a lagrange multiplier for a constraint.   The identities
are stated as inequalities that allow supply to be greater than or equal to demand. 
A. =
B. =
C. =
D. =
E. =
=
F. =
G. =
H. =
I. =
J. =
Market Equilibrium  
In the present case it turns out that market equilibrium results from welfare maximization 
with a quality constraint.  Some dimensions of this result are apparent after straightforward
inspection of first order conditions.  Other aspects are more involved. 
Direct inspection of equation c suggests that the marginal cost of inputs to additive
production (the price dependent supply equation) equal to the marginal benefit (8i) from using
another unit of the resource. Hence, the marginal value of additive production (:i) equals the sum
of marginal processing costs from the processing supply function plus factor costs (sum of input
9requirements times input prices) from equations b.   
Similarly, equation d states that the marginal cost of petroleum processing equals the net
marginal revenue.  The marginal cost comes directly from the petroleum processing equation. 
The revenues from byproduct processing are the sum of byproduct yields (xi) times the price of
the corresponding factor (8i) since the inputs of additive production are the byproducts of the
refinery.  Finally the sum of refinery gasoline yields (yi) times the lagrange multiplier (2i)
represent revenues from processing a unit of petroleum because the multiplier 2i is the marginal
increase in welfare (processor profit) from another unit of refinery gas type i.
For product pricing, consider a profit maximizing firm that buys refinery gas and additives
as inputs, and then blends them.  This marketing/blending firm maximizes profits subject to several
of the same constraints present in the maximum multane lagrangian.  Specifically,  supply
conditions for additives (:), refinery gas (2), and consumer gasoline blending (N), and the quality
constraint (R) must all be satisfied.  The constrained profit function is the revenues from sale of
consumer grade gasoline less input expenditures for additives and refinery gasoline:
  B  =  
        ! 
        ! 
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
        +
The marketer’s choice variables are:  Qs1, Qs2, Qs3, Qp1, Qp2, Qp3, Qr1, Qr2, Qr3, and Zij.
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The first order conditions for the profit maximizing marketer/blender are:
AN. =
BN. =
CN. =
EN. =
These conditions are the same as the welfare maximizing conditions.  In fact, equation (AN) is
identical to equation (A), except that (AN) contains one explicit price variable, while (A) contains
the quantity dependent price function.  Both versions state that the marginal benefit (price) of
consumer gasoline equals or exceeds the marginal cost of producing another unit of consumer’s
gasoline.  In turn, the marginal cost consists of two components:  the marginal value (Ni) of
another unit of blended gasoline supply and a quality adjustment that reflects the value of another
unit of octane supplied (Ri * Ki).  Next, equations (E) and (EN) state that the marginal value of
another unit of consumer gasoline equals the marginal cost of the corresponding additive or
refinery gasoline less a correction for the value of the octane provided by additive or refinery gas i
(Ri * Oi).  Equations (BN) and (CN) merely assign a market price variable to a lagrange multiplier.
In the case where the quality constraint is not binding (Ri = 0), the production and
consumer price revert to a more familiar form.  Specifically, equations (A) and (AN) state that the
marginal benefit or price of another unit of consumer gasoline equals the marginal cost (Ni). 
Meanwhile, equations (E) and (EN) state that the marginal cost of additive or refinery gasoline i
equals the marginal cost of blended consumer gasoline of grade i.  That is, the consumer price of
all gasoline grades are equal, and all additives and all types of refinery gasoline have the same
price.  Hence, the welfare maximization problem gives a market equilibrium, regardless of
whether a quality restriction is present.
Product Price and Quality Relationships
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To investigate the price and quality relationships implied by market equilibrium, look at
the marketer/blender margin between the sales price of blended gasoline and the purchase price
for additives or refinery gasoline.  Begin with the equation (A) for grade j of blended consumer
gasoline when the octane constraint is binding:
Psj = Nj +  Rj  Kj
The equation (E) for additive type i is:
Nj = Ppi - Rj Oi
Substituting yields and rearranging yields the marketing price relationship between consumer
prices for gasoline and the prices paid for additives:
Psj  +  Rj (Oi - Kj ) = Ppi
The second term on the left hand side of the above equation defines a price premium (discount)
that is paid for an additive i that has an octane above (below) the standard for grade j (Kj).  For
instance, Oi = 113 for ethanol and Kj = 87 for regular gasoline.  If Rj = $.01/octane.gallon, then the
ethanol price (Ppj) will exceed the price of regular gasoline (Psj) by $.52/gallon.  A similar price
relationship for the types of refinery gasoline can also be developed. The price for a low octane
refinery gasoline, like coker gas, would have a price below blended consumer gasoline.  
Usually, grade standards are associated with product performance or environmental attributes. 
Then the multiplier Rj represents a cost associated with producing quality.  But standards are
sometimes arbitrary.  In this context the shadow value times octane differential represents the
subsidy equivalent of the quality restriction for inputs having above average amounts of the
restricted attribute.  Similarly, the discount for below average inputs represents a tax associated
with the quality restriction.  
12
An Example
An example helps to demonstrate tractability of the programming problem and to illustrate
operation of markets with a quality constraint.  Modify a trade example from p. 143 of Takayama
and Judge (1971).  Three importing country demand equations from their example are used for
consumer gasoline demand in the new example.  Similarly, three exporting country supply
equations from their example are used as equations of factor supply for the additives industry.  
Also, processing supply functions for additives were added.  The reference point values of the
processing functions corresponds to the magnitude of transport costs in the trade example.  Then,
a petroleum price and processing function that were lower than the other factor supplies was
included, and the intercepts of factor supply equations were adjusted so that all factors and
processes were used in the baseline solution.  The assumed parameter values for supply and
demand functions are given in appendix table a.
The processing technology and quality assumptions correspond roughly to the actual
refinery and additives processes.  The yields of refinery gasoline from petroleum roughly
correspond to yields of coker gasoline, catalytic cracker gasoline, and reformer gasoline.  The
octane assumptions, low, medium, and high correspond to the same processes.  The refinery yields
of inputs for additives processing roughly correspond to the yields of iso-butane, butylene, and
propylene from oil. There are three additives processes.  The first process uses equal amounts of
factor 1 and factor 2.  The second additive process uses equal amounts of all three factors.  The
third Addie process uses only input three.  Roughly, the first two processes correspond to the
production of alkylates or polymer gasoline.  The third process corresponds to iso-octane or
perhaps ethanol.  The assumed octane values also correspond to alkylates, polymers, and ethanol,
respectively.  The assumed parameter values for process yields, octane content, and octane
standards are given in appendix b.
The results of two simulations are shown in table 1.  The right column shows the results of
13
the market simulation without the octane constraint.  The left column shows the market
simulation when the quality constraint is imposed.  The content of the simulations is interesting
because it depicts the situation in the additives and refinery gasoline competition; the additives
have more scarce and higher quality attributes than the refinery qualities.  Further, the average
quality of the refinery is below the performance standard set in the constraint.
Now, look at how the quality standard affects the market.  First, note that the price and
production of two additives increases.  Also note that the total additive output increases (table 2). 
Hence the price and quantity of all inputs to additive production also increase.  In contrast, the
consumption of petroleum decreases and the production of all types of refinery gas also falls. 
However, the decline in output of refinery gasoline is smaller than the increase in output of
gasoline additives(table 2).  Hence, the overall supply of gasoline to consumers increases and the
price for all grades of consumer gasoline falls.
The Processing and Marketing Costs and returns are shown in table 3.  Three broad
categories of activities are organized. Notice and the expenditures on raw materials and
processing costs match intermediate product sales within one-half of one percent. Similarly, the
intermediate product sales match the revenues from sales of final consumer products. Hence, the
estimates show the processing and marketing system doing business at cost, which one would
expect in a competitive system.  
Extensions
Constrained welfare maximization is still consistent with market equilibrium under a more
general set of policy assumptions that apply to the fuel and additives markets.  Other types of
quality constraints and fuel sector fiscal policies are particularly relevant.  Additional quality
constraints, such as vapor, oxygen and benzene content give constrained welfare maximization
conditions that are similar to equations (A)!(J) that have been discussed, except that a sum of
shadow values of quality constraints, instead of one shadow value, enter the first order conditions. 
14
Nonlinear constraints also give similar equilibrium conditions, except that the partial derivative of
a quality parameter with respect to a fuel type replaces the attribute concentration of the fuel type
in equilibrium conditions.
Two important fiscal policies in the gasoline fuel sector are the federal excise tax on
gasoline and the rebate for using ethanol blends.  Welfare maximization again turns out to be
consistent with market equilibrium, when the net revenue that the public sector extracts from the
gasoline and additives sector is subtracted from sector welfare. First, consider the excise tax. 
Suppose the tax on consumer gasoline of grade i is Tsi.  Then the government’s revenue for grade i
gasoline is Tsi * Qsi. 
Second, retailers receive a rebate of S $ for each gallon of grade i gasoline they sell that is
a 10% ethanol blend.  Further, a prorated subsidy is given for gasoline that contains less than a
10% blend. Suppose Z3i  is the quantity of ethanol blended into gasoline of grade i.  Then the
subsidy per gallon of gasoline is
(Z3i /Qsi ) (1/.1) S
Notice that the full subsidy is given when  Z3i /Qsi equals 0.1 and is prorated proportionately
otherwise.  The government expenditure, or more precisely the excise tax loss, associated with the
blending credit is 
which suggests that the blending credit is equivalent to a subsidy on additive 3 that is ten times the
rebate level in the gasoline market.  Hence, the government’s net revenue extraction from the fuel
sector is the excise tax less the ethanol blending rebate, added across gasoline grades.
When the revenue extraction is subtracted from the sector welfare function in the
15
lagrangian, the revised first order conditions give standard results for taxes and subsidies on
market prices.   For instance, the term Tsi is subtracted from the LHS of the first order condition
A. This gives the standard result for an excise tax in the marketplace, namely, that the producer
price plus the excise tax (and quality adjustment) equals the consumer price.  Similarly, the LHS
of equation E for additive 3 now add the term 10 S.  Combining equation A and additive 3’s
equation E, gives the revised marketing margin from additive 3 to gasoline grade i
Since additive 3 has the blending credit, the producer price of additive three will likely be above
the consumer gasoline price by (ten times) the amount that the blending credit exceeds the excise
tax collections. The price adjustment for additive qualities remains as before.
Summary and Conclusions
The markets for gasoline fuel factors, processing  and consumption are amenable to
mathematical programming models.  It was shown that markets provide the best possible
outcome, in the sense of maximizing sector welfare, in the presence of the performance and
environmental constraints the characterize the gasoline fuel industry.  For fiscal measures such as
excise taxes and ethanol blending credits, the sector welfare function must be reduced to account
for the government extraction of revenue from the sector. Then the Net welfare maximizing
conditions are still the market equilibrium conditions. This means that programming models can
anticipate the competitiveness of processes in the marketplace and evaluate policy changes with
reasonable data requirements.  The constrained welfare maximization equivalence to market
outcomes in the presence of government policies is very robust.  In fact, it seems to suggest a new
Second Best Principle for markets that must function next to an intervening government: the
market will provide the highest welfare for the sector, given the constraints imposed by
16
government policies.
The example problem is tractable.  Solutions were routinely obtained without convergence
problems and the results had magnitudes that corresponded roughly to Takayama and Judge trade
example.
The results also shed some light on how quality regulations function in the market. Quality
regulations provide a price incentive to expand output of additives and refinery gasolines with the
desired attributes.  They also reduce the price and output of gasoline components with less
desirable attributes.  As the example suggests, then it is possible that a consumer price decrease
can accompany a quality restriction when the elasticity of supply for additives is large enough to
offset the declining output of refinery gasoline.
The conventional view holds that a quality and environmental standard increases a firm’s
costs at fixed input price, and therefore raises consumers’ prices by a corresponding amount.  The
results of this paper show that market-level effects, such as adjusting factor prices, will offset or
maybe even reverse the conclusions of the firm-level analysis.
17
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Table 1.  The Effect of an Octane Standard on a Hypothetical Gasoline/Additive Sector
Variable Description  With Constraint      No Constraint
(Example Classification)
NSP 669.544 672.101
Product (Gasoline) Consumption (Qs)
(Regular) S1 48.160 47.081
(Mid) S2 23.892 23.540
(Premium) S3 37.928 37.664
Processed Product (Additive) Production (QP)
(MTBE) P1 28.463 21.291
(Alkylate) P2 10.318 19.428
(Ethanol) P3 20.807 15.812
Factor (Nat. Gas/Chemical) Supply (QR)
(Butane) L1 13.437 12.744
(Butylene) L2 15.537 14.900
(Nat. Gas) L3 20.955 18.967
Factor (Petroleum) Supply (QO) 172.518 167.975
Processed Product (Refinery) Production (Qr)
(Cat. Crack) 01 25.169 25.878
(Coker) 02 8.390   8.644
(Reformer) 03 16.780 17.252
Product (Gasoline) Consumer Price (Ps)
S1 15.184 15.292
S2 15.222 15.292
S3 15.229 15.292
Product (Gasoline) Supply Price (Marginal Cost) (Ni)
S1 13.476 15.292
S2 13.476 15.292
S3 13.476 15.292
F.O.B. (Additive) Supply Price (:i or Pp)
P1 15.522 15.292
P2 15.165 15.292
P3 15.616 15.292
F.O.B. (Refinery Gas) Supply Price (2i or Pr)
01 14.790 15.292
02 14.658 15.292
03 15.165 15.292
Factor (Chem/net. Gas) Supply Price (8i)
L1 16.344 16.274
L2 11.277 11.245
L3 14.096 13.897
Processing, Additive, Price ( )
P1 1.712 1.532
P2 1.258 1.486
P3 1.520 1.396
Processing, Petroleum, Price
4.299 4.413
Value of Octane Constraint (Qi)
S1 0.012 0
S2 0.012 0
S3 0.012 0
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Table 2.   Origin and Distribution of Refinery Gasoline and Additives to Gasoline by Grade 
with quality constraint
to
from s1 s2 s3 total
p1 8.247 8.799 11.417 28.463
p2        0 10.318       0 10.318
p3 8.041        0 12.766 20.807 additives 59.588
o1 15.075 4.775 5.345 25.195
o2        0        0 8.399 8.399
o3 16.797        0       0 16.797 refinery 50.391
total 48.16 23.892 37.927 109.979
without quality constraint
to
from s1 s2 s3 total
p1 15.567       0 5.724 21.291
p2 14.635       0 4.792 19.427
p3 12.827       0 2.984 15.811 additives 56.529
o1        0 10.988 14.89 25.878
o2 4.051 4.575       0 8.626
o3        0 7.981 9.274 17.255 refinery 51.759
total 47.08 23.544 37.664 108.288
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Table 3.  Processing and Marketing Costs and Revenues
SELL FINAL CONSUMER PRODUCTS
Ps Qs REVENUE
15.184 48.16 731.2614
15.222 23.892 363.684
15.229 37.92 577.4837
SUM 1672.429
SELL INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS (ADDITIVES AND REFINERY GAS)
Pp Qp REVENUE
15.222 28.463 433.2638
15.165 10.318 156.4725
15.616 20.807 324.9221
Pr Qr
14.79 24.169 357.4595
14.658 8.39 122.9806
15.165 16.78 254.4687
SUM 1649.567
PURCHASE RAW MATERIALS AND PAY FOR PROCESSING COSTS
1 167.975 167.975
Qo REVENUE
4.299 167.975 722.1245
 Qp
1.172 28.463 33.35864
1.258 10.318 12.98004
1.52 20.807 31.62664
SUM 77.96532
PR PR
16.344 13.437 219.6143
11.277 15.537 175.2107
14.096 20.955 295.3817
SUM 690.2068 1658.272
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Appendix Table A.  Supply and Demand Parameters
Product (Gasoline) Demand:
"s1 = 20.0 $s1 = 0.1
"s2 = 20.0 $s2 = 0.2
"s3 = 20.0 $s3 = 0.125
Processed (Additives) Services Supply:
"p1 = 1.0 $p1 = 0.025
"p2 = 1.0 $p2 = 0.025
"p3 = 1.0 $p3 = 0.025
Processed (Oil) Services Supply:
"o = 0.1 $o = 0.025 Po = 1.0
Factor (Chemical) Supply:
"R1 = 15.0 $R1 = 0.1
"R2 = 15.0 $R2 = 0.05
"R3 = 15.0 $R3 = 0.1
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Appendix Table B.  Technology and Quality Parameters
Refining gasoline yields per unit of oil processed
y1 = 0.15
y2 = 0.05
y3 = 0.10
Refinery by product yields per unit of oil processed
x1 = 0.025
x2 = 0.0125
x3 = 0.020
Requirement of input Ri per unit output of additives type pi
R1 0.5 0.33 0.0
R2 0.5 0.33 0.0
R3 0.0 0.34 1.0
Octane standard by grade of gasoline
k1 = 91
k2 = 93
k3 = 95
Octane content of gasoline components
01 70
02 63
03 90
P1 109
P2 90
P3 114
Chart 1.  Factor-Product Relationships in the Gasoline/Additives Market.
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